Rules of Engagement and Other Stupid Decisions
(September 15, 2009) | 
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| Harlingen, Texas, September 12, 2009
-- By now you have heard the story. Taliban insurgents
ambushed a 13-man team of U.S. Marine and Army advisors
assigned to the Afghan National Army as they approached
a small hamlet. Repeatedly the Marines called for
artillery support that was denied by their commanders
and helicopter gunship support that took more than one
hour to arrive. The refused support and slow air
response caused the unit to suffer eight Afghan
soldiers, one interpreter and four Marines to be killed
in action.
The uproar across the military community has been
deafening and the NATO commanded forces are now
investigating why commanding officers rejected repeated
calls for artillery fire. They are also looking into the
reason why close air support that was supposed to be no
more than five minutes away took more than one hour to
reach the scene of the battle.
Far be it for me to claim I am some kind of Warfighting
Strategist. However, it doesn't take the military
intellect of a Patton to understand dumb decisions or
political pontification. That being said, I have no
reason to believe the current Rules of Engagement (ROE)
in Afghanistan originated with those commanders on the
ground who are actually engaged in the fighting.
The Rules of Engagement now in effect in that war zone
are designed to appease the faint hearted rather than
win a war. Are they wrong headed? Yes! Are they tailored
in such a way they will harm our troops in the field? We
have the bodies of four gallant young Marines along with
eight national army dead to prove just how wrong the ROE
is for Americans and its allies.
According to military spokesmen, the ROE has been
tailored to soften the possibility of civilian
casualties. General Stanley McChrystal issued the new
ROE restrictions on the use of military force to reduce
the risk of further alienating the population, they say.
Colonel Wayne Morris, USMC (Ret) served in the very
volatile areas of Kandahar and Helmand through half of
2006 and all of 2008 as an advisor to the Afghan
National Army. He says, “With the current ROE in effect,
I seriously doubt we will ever get the stabilized level
wherein we can turn the tables on the Taliban.” He feels
we need to eliminate enough insurgents nor at least
neutralize their ability to influence action across a
wide area, for any stabilized condition to develop.
Morris also believes we need to empower the Afghan
forces to shoulder the load and gain the confidence of
the Afghan people. He concludes that comment saying,
“They have a long way to go before they are anywhere
near being considered a viable force.”
While waiting for that national force to come of age, we
must continue to endure politically motivated Rules of
Engagement that have nothing to do with protecting the
lives of our military warfighters.
Regardless of the war we were fighting, instead of
allowing our military experts to determine how we engage
in combat, political decision makers, almost from the
time the first shots were fired in anger, have
restricted those who wear the uniform of our country. In
just about every case, politicians created those
horrible unintended consequences that resulted in loss
of the battle, the loss of victory, and sadly, the loss
of American lives. The most heartbreaking example of
that political decision-making is the disastrous finale
to Vietnam, triggered by our capitulation and
withdrawal.
As an infantry Corporal in Korea, I screamed at anyone
who would listen as we repeatedly fought our way to
strategic high ground, only to withdraw and be forced to
take the same real estate over and over again. One of
the basic rules of battle is to seize the high ground .
. . and hold it.
On another tour of duty, in Saigon everyone wore helmets
and carried weapons to and from their various duty
assignments. Military personnel were also allowed to
wander the streets of that city freely during off duty
hours but it was a court marshal offense to carry a
weapon. Try to figure the logic of that rule.
As an advisor during the early days of Vietnam we were
not even allowed to wear our uniforms or fly the
American Flag. At night, on perimeter duty the Marines
were not allowed to have ammunition in their weapons. It
was locked up in an ammo bunker and one officer had the
key. If we were fired upon, the ROE called for him to
then open the bunker and issue us ammunition. Those
rules seem silly in print, but were very serious to
those of us who guarded the compound in the dark of
night. Our uniform thought was . . . ”What happens if
that first incoming round gets the ammo officer or hits
the bunker?” This would have been another example of
unintended consequences all military personnel face
because of wrong-headed ROE. (It is also true that we
ignored those ROE and kept a hidden supply of ammunition
on our persons.)
Returning to the words of Colonel Morris, “Tying our
Warfighter's hands behind their backs is past
unsatisfactory . . . it's criminal! I am not saying we
should allow our Coalition Forces to move about freely
killing everything in their path, but they must be
allowed the leeway to take appropriate, decisive
offensive or defensive actions when dealing with
insurgents. Not only that, there are a lot of good
Afghans who see our approach in dealing with the Taliban
as being ‘weak'. That makes many people over there think
the Talibs are stronger . . . not in all cases, but as
you well know, perceptions are damning.”
Again, it should be noted that Wayne Morris has been on
the ground in that war zone and has seen our actions up
close and personal. He feels two major aspects of how we
are conducting our combat strategy are self-defeating.
He names them as “an overly restrictive ROE and the lack
of adequate supporting arms.”
He claims the Rules of Engagement have favored the enemy
since our involvement after 9-11. He feels we would have
captured or killed Osama Bin Laden if our special
operators had been allowed to take him down. He claims
the ROE is even more restrictive now than it was early
in the war. Morris also notes many people are unhappy
with General McChrystal. “He is playing the hand he has
been dealt by folks in D.C”, says the colonel. “He's no
slouch when it comes to fighting unconventional forces,
but there would seem to be considerable angst among the
operational elements regarding his recent comments that
have gone along with the ROE currently in effect.”
The colonel feels the lack of supporting arms have been
a major problem from the very start of operations. “With
the exception of USMC and some Army forces now operating
in Afghanistan, the other Coalition Force partner
nations simply don't have adequate supporting arms
available to them.” He tells of times in Helmand
Province when only two armed helicopters (and on a good
day four) were available for the entire province.
He claims that some light artillery was available, but
it lacked the range to reach many target areas. He notes
further that many of the coalition partner nations have
restricted the actions of their forces to the point
where they are almost non-combatants. Added together and
combined with Rules of Engagement that often disallowed
the use of very limited assets created a situation that,
in the colonel's own words, “Made a recipe for failure .
. . and evidently still does!”
So, as it has always been, the politicians and the
political military leaders continue to make decisions
and Rules of Engagement that must be followed by
Warfighters on the ground. And, as it always has been,
those same military men and women continue to fight two
enemies. Today it is the Taliban, but forever it has
been the politicians who though complete ignorance cost
us victory after victory . . . and far too many American
lives. | |
By
Thomas D. Segel
Tom@thomasdsegel.com
www.thomasdsegel.com
Copyright
2009
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